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Child support guidelines and divorce incentives

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  • Allen, Douglas W.
  • Brinig, Margaret

Abstract

A child support guideline is a formula used to calculate support payments based on a few family characteristics. Guidelines began replacing court awarded support payments in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and were eventually mandated by the federal government in 1988. Two fundamentally different types of guidelines are used: percentage of obligor income, and income shares models. This paper explores the incentives to divorce under the two schemes, and uses the NLSY data set to test the key predictions. We find that percentage of obligor income models are destabilizing for some families with high incomes. This may explain why several states have converted from obligor to income share models, and it provides a subtle lesson for the no-fault divorce debate.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Douglas W. & Brinig, Margaret, 2012. "Child support guidelines and divorce incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-316.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:3:p:309-316
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.04.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Allen & Margaret Brinig, 2011. "Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 304-324, June.
    2. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-292, July.
    3. Allen, Douglas W., 1990. "An inquiry into the state's role in marriage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 171-191, March.
    4. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, February.
    5. Douglas W. Allen, 2007. "The Effect on Divorce of Legislated Net-Wealth Transfers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 580-597, October.
    6. Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December.
    7. R.Mark Rogers & Donald J. Bieniewicz, 2004. "Child support guidelines: underlying methodologies, assumptions, and the impact on standards of living," Chapters, in: William S. Comanor (ed.), The Law and Economics of Child Support Payments, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schaubert, Marianna, 2022. "Do courts know how to incentivize? Behavioral response of non-resident parents to child support obligations," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    2. Brigitte Pereira, 2023. "Guidelines, court decisions and dismissals [Barèmes d’indemnisation, décisions de justice et licenciement]," Post-Print hal-04190156, HAL.
    3. Tilak Sanyal & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2019. "On General and Specific Transfers for Child Support in Divorce," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 17(1), pages 197-213, March.
    4. Clara E. Piano, 2022. "Autocratic family policy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 233-253, June.
    5. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier, 2021. "Guidelines: Decision-Making Tools for Litigantsand Judges [Les barèmes, outils d’aide à la décision pour les justiciables et les juges]," Post-Print hal-03054417, HAL.

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