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Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions

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  • Mungan, Murat C.

Abstract

Sanctions for regulation violations are used to deter conduct which could potentially result in great social harms. This practice over-deters low-risk entities and under-deters high-risk entities, which leads to social losses. This paper analyzes whether and how such social losses can be mitigated. I show that this can be achieved by allowing regulatees to purchase passes exempting them from regulations at appropriate prices, although they remain liable for any harm they cause.

Suggested Citation

  • Mungan, Murat C., 2011. "Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 249-255.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:4:p:249-255
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.06.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shavell, Steven, 1990. "Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 435-466, June.
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    7. repec:bla:jecsur:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:267-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Grolleau & Murat Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2022. "Letting Offenders Choose Their Own Punishment ?," Post-Print hal-03694337, HAL.
    2. Mungan, Murat C., 2012. "Don’t Say You’re Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing apologies to achieve credibility," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 178-187.
    3. Mungan, Murat C., 2017. "Reducing crime through expungements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 398-409.
    4. Gilles Grolleau & Murat C. Mungan & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2022. "Letting offenders choose their punishment?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 607-617, November.
    5. Humphery-Jenner, Mark, 2012. "The impact of the EU takeover directive on takeover performance and empire building," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 254-272.
    6. Miller, Amalia R. & Eibner, Christine & Gresenz, Carole Roan, 2013. "Financing of employer sponsored health insurance plans before and after health reform: What consumers don’t know won’t hurt them?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 36-47.

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