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Deterrence and avoidance

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  • Nussim, Jacob
  • Tabbach, Avraham D.

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime - by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts - does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nussim, Jacob & Tabbach, Avraham D., 2009. "Deterrence and avoidance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 314-323, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:4:p:314-323
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2014. "Regulating harmless activity to fight crime," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 79-95, September.
    10. Angus W. H. Yip & William Y. P. Yu, 2023. "The Quality of Environmental KPI Disclosure in ESG Reporting for SMEs in Hong Kong," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-26, February.
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    12. Uri Weiss, 2015. "The Robber Wants To Be Punished," Discussion Paper Series dp685, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    13. Mauro, Luciano & Pigliaru, Francesco & Carmeci, Gaetano, 2023. "Decentralization, social capital, and regional growth: The case of the Italian North-South divide," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
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