On the role of the exclusionary rule for optimal law enforcement effort
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DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12321
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2021.
"Private protection and public policing,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 5-28, February.
- Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2019. "Private Protection and Public Policing," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2019n04, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
- Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy Ypersele, 2021. "Private protection and public policing," Post-Print hal-03391506, HAL.
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