Pricing high-risk and low-risk insurance contracts with incomplete information and production costs
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DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.03.005
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- hector chade, 2016. "The Market for Lemons: Costly Insurance, Coverage Denials, and Pooling," 2016 Meeting Papers 1097, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward E., 2020. "Insurance as a lemons market: Coverage denials and pooling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
- Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov & John L. Turner, 2021.
"Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 83-115, February.
- Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov & John L. Turner, 2019. "Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition," Working Paper Series 2019/11, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Yann Braouezec, 2015. "Public versus Private Insurance System with (and without) Transaction Costs: Optimal Segmentation Policy of an Informed monopolistPublic versus Private Insurance System with (and without) Transaction ," Working Papers 2013-ECO-23, IESEG School of Management, revised May 2014.
- Moghaddasi, Reza & Eghbali, Alireza & Lakhaye Rizi, Parisa, 2014. "Analysis and Forecasting of Drought by Developing a Fuzzy-Based Hybrid Index in Iran," MPRA Paper 53153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete information; State dependent utility; Complete insurance; Partial insurance; Production costs; Expenses; Competitive markets; Monopolistic markets;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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