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How Efficient is a Contestable Natural Monopoly?

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  • Alfons J. Weichenrieder
  • Alfons Weichenrieder

Abstract

This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. With restricted entry, the standard result in this case is that the monopoly offers a menu of price-quantity combinations which leads to the well-known 'no-distortion-at-the-top` pricing. Low demand consumers are induced to consume less than their first-best quantity, while high demand consumers buy a quantity where their marginal willingness to pay equals marginal cost. The paper shows that this type of inefficiency may also appear in a contestable market. Depending on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can al so be a sustainable equilibrium. However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is never guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable 'distortion-at-the-top' result is possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 1999. "How Efficient is a Contestable Natural Monopoly?," CESifo Working Paper Series 186, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_186
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:215:p:315-16 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, 2003. "Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 36(4), pages 415-427, December.

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