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Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact

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  • Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:61:y:2003:i:1:p:187-208
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    2. Alessandra Casella, 1999. "Tradable deficit permits: efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 14(29), pages 322-361.
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    5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030, Elsevier.
    6. Marc Flandreau & Jacques Le Cacheux & Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European gold standard, 1880—1914," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 116-162.
    7. Marc Flandreau & Jacques Le Cacheux & Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stability without a pact?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03416381, HAL.
    8. Bottazzi, Laura & Manasse, Paolo, 1998. "Bankers' Versus Workers' Europe (I): Adverse Selection in EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 1846, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    11. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
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    14. Marc Flandreau & Jacques Le Cacheux & Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stability without a pact?," Post-Print hal-03416381, HAL.
    15. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-571, October.
    16. Agell, Jonas & Calmfors, Lars & Jonsson, Gunnar, 1996. "Fiscal policy when monetary policy is tied to the mast," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1413-1440, August.
    17. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-1059, November.
    18. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
    19. Guillermo A. Calvo & Pablo E. Guidotti, 1993. "On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 667-687.
    20. Wyplosz, Charles, 1991. "Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Discipline," CEPR Discussion Papers 488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 66-113.
    22. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tilman Brück & Andreas Stephan, 2006. "Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 3-15, February.
    2. Herzog, Bodo, 2005. "Why do bigger countries have more problems with the Stability and Growth Pact?," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 40, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    3. Bodo HERZOG, 2010. "European Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Sustainability," EcoMod2004 330600067, EcoMod.
    4. repec:got:cegedp:40 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Florin Bilbiie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Papers 2005-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    6. Giovanni Ganelli, 2008. "Public Spending Management and Macroeconomic Interdependence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 241-259, April.
    7. Beetsma, Roel & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2014. "An analysis of eurobonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 91-111.
    8. Huber, Bernd & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2350-2361, December.
    9. Bodo Herzog, 2004. "Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?: Eine theoretische Beweisaufnahme," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 405-417.
    10. Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2004. "Regelgebundene versus diskretionäre Wirtschaftspolitik: das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 381-391.
    11. Herold, Katharina, 2009. "Intergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric information," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-2, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    12. Florin Bilbiie, 2001. "Fiscal Contracts for a Monetary Union," Working Papers hal-00515663, HAL.
    13. Campoy Juan Cristóbal & Negrete Juan C., 2010. "Structural Reforms and Budget Deficits in a Monetary Union: A Strategic Approach," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, July.

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