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Regelgebundene versus diskretionäre Wirtschaftspolitik: das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes

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  • Renate Ohr
  • André Schmidt

Abstract

The following paper deals on the problems of time inconsistency in connection with the stability and growth pact. The authors conclude that the current practice of application of the stability and growth pact is not appropriate for reducing the problems of time inconsistency. The stability pact will yield disciplining effects only if it will be credible applied. Therefore, the authors emphasises a more rule and less discretion orientated application of the stability and growth pact. Der vorliegende Beitrag thematisiert den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt unter Berücksichtigung von Zeitinkonsistenzproblemen. Die Verfasser gelangen zu dem Ergebnis, dass die bisherige Anwendungspraxis des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes nicht geeignet ist, die Zeitinkonsistenzprobleme zu reduzieren. Vom Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt wird nur dann eine disziplinierende Wirkung ausgehen, wenn dieser auch glaubwürdig umgesetzt wird. Daher betonen die Verfasser die Notwendigkeit einer stärkeren Regelbindung anstelle der in der bisherigen Anwendung bestehenden hohen diskretionären Ermessensspielräume.

Suggested Citation

  • Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2004. "Regelgebundene versus diskretionäre Wirtschaftspolitik: das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 381-391.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-5
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.3.381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Renate Ohr & André Schmidt, 2006. "Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte zur Sicherung fiskalischer Stabilität in der Währungsunion?," Departmental Discussion Papers 128, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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