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Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

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  • Vasconcelos, Helder

Abstract

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasconcelos, Helder, 2015. "Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:40:y:2015:i:c:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Jullien & Alessandro Pavan & Marc Rysman, 2021. "Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects," Post-Print hal-03828345, HAL.
    2. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Amelio, Andrea & Giardino-Karlinger, Liliane & Valletti, Tommaso, 2020. "Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Barna Bakó & Dániel Fátay, 2019. "Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 141-154, March.
    5. Wenqing Wu & Xuan Huang & Yue Li & Chien-Chi Chu, 2018. "Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-17, April.
    6. Zhou, Yongyi & Zhang, Yulin & Goh, Mark, 2023. "Platform responses to entry in a local market with mobile providers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(1), pages 236-251.
    7. Pietro Crocioni, 2018. "On The Relevant Cost Standard For Price–Cost Test In Abuses Of Dominance," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 262-291.
    8. Justus Haucap, 2019. "Competition and Competition Policy in a Data-Driven Economy," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 54(4), pages 201-208, July.
    9. Vasconcelos, Helder, 2015. "Exclusionary pricing in markets with interdependent demands," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 24-28.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided markets; Exclusion; Demand externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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