Exclusionary pricing in markets with interdependent demands
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.005
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More about this item
Keywords
Exclusionary pricing; Demand externalities; Entry;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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