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Aftermarket power and foremarket competition

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  • Cabral, Luís

Abstract

I revisit the issue of aftermarkets by developing an infinite period model with overlapping consumers. If the aftermarket is characterized by constant returns to scale, then social surplus and consumer surplus are invariant with respect to aftermarket power. Under increasing returns to scale, however, greater aftermarket power leads to: greater concentration in the foremarket; higher barriers to entry; higher social surplus; and possibly higher consumer surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabral, Luís, 2014. "Aftermarket power and foremarket competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 60-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:60-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.06.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Farrell, 2017. "Some Simple Analytics of Vertically Linked Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(4), pages 431-440, June.
    2. Dainis Zēgners & Tobias Kretschmer, 2017. "Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 96-122, February.
    3. Marco Savioli & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2020. "Does add-on presence always lead to lower baseline prices? Theory and evidence," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 129(2), pages 143-172, March.
    4. Marco Savioli & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2015. "Add-On Pricing: Theory and Evidence From the Cruise Industry," Working Paper series 15-26, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised May 2016.
    5. Kirkizoğlu, Zeynep & Karaer, Özgen, 2022. "After-sales service and warranty decisions of a durable goods manufacturer," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aftermarkets; Dynamic price competition; Market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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