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Price discrimination via information provision

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  • Bang, Se Hoon
  • Kim, Jaesoo

Abstract

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.

Suggested Citation

  • Bang, Se Hoon & Kim, Jaesoo, 2013. "Price discrimination via information provision," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 215-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:25:y:2013:i:4:p:215-224
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.06.001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bang, Se Hoon & Jin, Yangsoo, 2015. "Brand-specificity of pre-sale services and inter-brand competition with resale price maintenance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-9.
    2. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120364, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    3. Pham, Hien, "undated". "a reprendre_ WP annulé," TSE Working Papers 21-1263, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.
    5. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120989, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    6. Zhong, Yuyun & Shen, Wenjing & Ceryan, Oben, 2023. "Information provision under showrooming and webrooming," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    7. Lin Liu & Anthony Dukes, 2016. "Consumer Search with Limited Product Evaluation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 32-55, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D42; D82; L11; L81; Price discrimination; Information; Screening; Online and offline;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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