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Price Discrimination with Demarketing

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  • Jaesoo Kim
  • Dongsoo Shin

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  • Jaesoo Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2016. "Price Discrimination with Demarketing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 773-807, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:4:p:773-807
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    3. Eitan Gerstner & Duncan Holthausen, 1986. "Profitable Pricing When Market Segments Overlap," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 55-69.
    4. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994. "Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 309-327, May.
    5. Michael D. Grubb, 2009. "Selling to Overconfident Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1770-1807, December.
    6. Heski Bar‐Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cuñat, 2010. "Information Gathering and Marketing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 375-401, June.
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    8. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    9. Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin & Rosar, Frank, 2011. "Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 141-162, January.
    10. Marco Ottaviani & Andrea Prat, 2001. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1673-1683, November.
    11. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
    12. Chakravarthi Narasimhan, 1984. "A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(2), pages 128-147.
    13. Hao Zhao, 2000. "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 390-396, January.
    14. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    15. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    16. Birger Wernerfelt, 1994. "Selling Formats for Search Goods," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(3), pages 298-309.
    17. Praveen K. Kopalle & Donald R. Lehmann, 2006. "Setting Quality Expectations When Entering a Market: What Should the Promise Be?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 8-24, 01-02.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    2. Salem, Mohammed Z. & Ertz, Myriam & Sarigӧllü, Emine, 2021. "Demarketing strategies to rationalize electricity consumption in the Gaza Strip-Palestine," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).

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