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La nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels : fondements et tests

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  • Philippe Gagnepain

    (Departamento de Economía - UC3M - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid [Madrid])

Abstract

The inefficiency of a firm depends on several characteristics and decisions which are non-observable by an external individual. The economic theory has recently taken into account these situations through asymmetric information problems between principals and agents. Such problems consider moral hazard and adverse selection issues. The regulation of natural monopolies has thus been re-examined through the window of the theory of incentives. This article proposes an overview of the new theory of regulation and tries to provide an almost exhaustive state of empirical works realized so far on the topic.

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  • Philippe Gagnepain, 2001. "La nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels : fondements et tests," Post-Print hal-00622947, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00622947
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00622947
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