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Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review

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  • Mauro, Marianna
  • Rotundo, Giorgia
  • Giancotti, Monica

Abstract

Preventive care, such as screening, is important for reducing the risk of cancer, a leading cause of death worldwide. Indeed, some type of cancers are detected through screening programs, which in most countries run for colorectal, breast, and cervical cancers. In this context, general practitioners play a key role in increasing the participation rate in cancer screening programs. To improve cancer screening delivery rates, performance incentives have increasingly been implemented in primary care by healthcare payers and organizations in different countries. The effects of these tools are still not clear.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauro, Marianna & Rotundo, Giorgia & Giancotti, Monica, 2019. "Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(12), pages 1210-1220.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:123:y:2019:i:12:p:1210-1220
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2019.09.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Sicsic & Carine Franc, 2017. "Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(5), pages 609-621, June.
    2. Panayotis Constantinou & Jonathan Sicsic & Carine Franc, 2017. "Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 181-201, June.
    3. Sicsic, Jonathan & Krucien, Nicolas & Franc, Carine, 2016. "What are GPs' preferences for financial and non-financial incentives in cancer screening? Evidence for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 116-127.
    4. Kathleen J. Mullen & Richard G. Frank & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 2010. "Can you get what you pay for? Pay‐for‐performance and the quality of healthcare providers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 64-91, March.
    5. Hillman, A.L. & Ripley, K. & Goldfarb, N. & Nuamah, I. & Weiner, J. & Lusk, E., 1998. "Physician financial incentives and feedback: Failure to increase cancer screening in Medicaid managed care," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 88(11), pages 1699-1701.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Helen Hayes & Jonathan Stokes & Matt Sutton & Rachel Meacock, 2024. "How do hospitals respond to payment unbundling for diagnostic imaging of suspected cancer patients?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(5), pages 823-843, May.
    3. Daniel Rojas-Díaz & María Eugenia Puerta-Yepes & Daniel Medina-Gaspar & Jesús Alonso Botero & Anwar Rodríguez & Norberto Rojas, 2023. "Mathematical Modeling for the Assessment of Public Policies in the Cancer Health-Care System Implemented for the Colombian Case," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(18), pages 1-36, September.
    4. Sangkwon Kim & Youngjin Hwang & Chaeyoung Lee & Soobin Kwak & Junseok Kim, 2023. "Estimation of Total Cost Required in Controlling COVID-19 Outbreaks by Financial Incentives," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(2), pages 1-15, January.

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