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Selling privacy at auction

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  • Ghosh, Arpita
  • Roth, Aaron

Abstract

We study markets for private data using differential privacy. We consider a setting in which a data analyst wishes to buy information from a population from which he can estimate some statistic. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply, while the owners of the private data experience some cost for their loss of privacy. Agents are rational and we wish to design truthful mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Arpita & Roth, Aaron, 2015. "Selling privacy at auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 334-346.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:334-346
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006. "On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
    2. Vincent Conitzer & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. "Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 277-292, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    2. Janis Cloos & Björn Frank & Lukas Kampenhuber & Stephany Karam & Nhat Luong & Daniel Möller & Maria Monge-Larrain & Nguyen Tan Dat & Marco Nilgen & Christoph Rössler, 2019. "Is Your Privacy for Sale? An Experiment on the Willingness to Reveal Sensitive Information," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-15, July.
    3. Haifei Yu & Shanshan Zheng & Hao Wu, 2023. "User Privacy Awareness, Incentive and Data Supply Chain Pricing Strategy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-24, February.
    4. Emily Diana & Michael Kearns & Seth Neel & Aaron Roth, 2019. "Optimal, Truthful, and Private Securities Lending," Papers 1912.06202, arXiv.org.
    5. John M. Abowd & Ian M. Schmutte & William Sexton & Lars Vilhuber, 2019. "Suboptimal Provision of Privacy and Statistical Accuracy When They are Public Goods," Papers 1906.09353, arXiv.org.
    6. Sameer Mehta & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman & Vijay Mookerjee, 2022. "An Approximation Scheme for Data Monetization," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(6), pages 2412-2428, June.
    7. Chanchai Phonthanukitithaworn & Carmine Sellitto, 2022. "A Willingness to Disclose Personal Information for Monetary Reward: A Study of Fitness Tracker Users in Thailand," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privacy; Mechanism design;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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