Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006
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Citations
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Cited by:
- OKADA, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 2014-17, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Huang, Yuankan & Inohara, Takehiro, 2015. "Group-separations based on the repeated prisoners’ dilemma games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 256(C), pages 267-275.
- Shyh-Fang Ueng, 2021. "Campaigning internally or externally," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 245-267, June.
- Akira Okada, 2015.
"Cooperation and Institution in Games,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," Discussion Papers 2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Akira Okada, 2018. "Non-cooperative Bargaining for Side Payments Contract," KIER Working Papers 983, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
Group formation; Prisonerʼs dilemma; Repeated games; Non-cooperative coalitional bargaining; Efficiency; Renegotiation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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