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International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective

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  • OKADA, Akira
  • 岡田, 章

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  • OKADA, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 2014-17, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2014-17
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26955/070econDP14-17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2009. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1335-1355, September.
    3. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Okada, Akira, 1993. "The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 629-656, November.
    6. Akira Okada, 2008. "The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 165-182, June.
    7. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2012. "Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 269-284.
    8. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
    9. Robert H. Bates, 1988. "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(2-3), pages 387-401, June.
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