Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow
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Citations
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- Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2013. "Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 352-368, December.
- Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2023. "Common myths of terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 271-301, April.
- Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
- Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
- Cárceles-Poveda, Eva & Tauman, Yair, 2011. "A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 49-65, January.
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"The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(2), pages 313-330, April.
- J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," Working Papers 0805, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu & Runkel, Marco, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," MPRA Paper 7687, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- J. Atsu Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2008. "The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts," CESifo Working Paper Series 2261, CESifo.
- Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2014. "A game-theoretic analysis of information sharing and security investment for complementary firms," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 65(11), pages 1682-1691, November.
- Levitin, Gregory & Hausken, Kjell, 2011. "Preventive strike vs. false targets and protection in defense strategy," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 96(8), pages 912-924.
- Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2023.
"Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy,"
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- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2022. "Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy," Working Papers 2022-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Opher Baron & Oded Berman & Arieh Gavious, 2018. "A Game Between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 27(3), pages 433-457, March.
- João Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2021. "The Path of Terror Attacks," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-11, April.
- Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang, 2011. "Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T -Period Game," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 46-70, March.
- Bertrand Crettez & Naila Hayek, 2014. "Terrorists’ Eradication Versus Perpetual Terror War," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 679-702, February.
- Kjell Hausken, 2019. "A Game Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-15, December.
- Satya P. Das & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2014.
"Deterrence, Preemption, And Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem Of Terrorism,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 219-238, January.
- Das, Satya P. & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2008. "Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism," MPRA Paper 8223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wang, Shuliang & Gu, Xifeng & Luan, Shengyang & Zhao, Mingwei, 2021. "Resilience analysis of interdependent critical infrastructure systems considering deep learning and network theory," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
- Satya P. Das & Sajal Lahiri, 2021. "Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 416-445, December.
- Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.
- Simon, Jay & Omar, Ayman, 2020. "Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: Coordination and a strategic attacker," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 161-171.
- Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017.
"Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
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- Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
- Liang, Liang & Chen, Jingxian & Siqueira, Kevin, 2020. "Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender–attacker conflicts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 1180-1190.
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Keywords
Terrorism Terror capacity Threat Conflict Two periods Dynamics Growth Discounting Defense inefficiency Attack inefficiency Contest success function Time substitution;Statistics
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