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Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

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  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie
  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:63:y:1999:i:2:p:181-185
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993. "Coordinating research through research joint ventures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June.
    3. Maija Halonen, 2002. "Reputation And The Allocation Of Ownership," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 539-558, July.
    4. D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1995. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a43, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    5. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February.
    6. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    7. David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386.
    8. repec:cep:stitep:/1995/289 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Moore, John, 1992. "The firm as a collection of assets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 493-507, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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