Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
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Cited by:
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2021.
"Evolutionary Stability of Behavioural Rules,"
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112920, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 May 2022.
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2021. "Evolutionary Stability of Behavioural Rules," MPRA Paper 111309, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Moti Michaeli & Daniel Spiro, "undated".
"The dynamics of revolutions,"
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WP2017/8, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Spiro, Daniel & Michaeli, Moti, 2016. "The dynamics of revolutions," Memorandum 16/2016, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Josephson, Jens, 2009.
"Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
- Josephson, Jens, 2001. "Stochastic Adaptation in Finite Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 475, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Daan Lindeman & Marius I. Ochea, 2024. "Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-26, February.
- Juang, W-T. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Rules and Mutation - A Theory of How Efficiency and Rawlsian Egalitarianism/Symmetry May Emerge," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2101, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- G. Klaassen & A. V. Kryazhimskii & A. M. Tarasyev, 2004. "Multiequilibrium Game of Timing and Competition of Gas Pipeline Projects," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 120(1), pages 147-179, January.
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2018. "Games between responsive behavioural rules," MPRA Paper 90429, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David Chavalarias, 2006. "Metamimetic Games : Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition," Post-Print hal-00007743, HAL.
- David Chavalarias, 2006. "Metamimetic Games: Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 9(2), pages 1-5.
- Juang, Wei-Torng, 2002. "Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 71-90, April.
- Abhimanyu Khan, 2021. "Evolution of conventions in games between behavioural rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 209-224, October.
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2021.
"Evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 399-414.
- Khan, Abhimanyu, 2018. "Evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in bargaining," MPRA Paper 90811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Germano, Fabrizio, 2002.
"On (un)knots and dynamics in games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-60, October.
- DE MICHELIS, Stefano & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2000. "On knots and dynamics in games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- DeMichelis, S. & Germano, F., 2000. "On Knots and Dynamics in Games," Papers 2-2000, Tel Aviv.
- Semeshenko, Viktoriya & Gordon, Mirta B. & Nadal, Jean-Pierre, 2008. "Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(19), pages 4903-4916.
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