Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall
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Cited by:
- Jude Kline, J., 2002. "Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 278-305, February.
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997.
"The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, July.
- Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A., 1996. "The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses," Papers 39-96, Tel Aviv.
- Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2020. "Backward induction in games without perfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 207-218.
- Nicola Dimitri, 2009. "Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 345-354, April.
- M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan, 2014.
"Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox”,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 65-88, February.
- Vittoria M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro'i Zultan, 2010. "Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox"," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1999. "Extensive and strategic forms: Games and models for games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 293-319, September.
- Nicola Dimitri, 2005. "Dynamic Consistency in Extensive form Decision Problems," Department of Economics University of Siena 455, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Raphael Thomadsen & Pradeep Bhardwaj, 2011. "Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(2), pages 363-375, February.
- Lambert, Nicolas S. & Marple, Adrian & Shoham, Yoav, 2019. "On equilibria in games with imperfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 164-185.
- Sudipta Sarangi & Cary Deck, 2006. "Inducing Absent-Mindedness in the Lab," Departmental Working Papers 2006-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
- Kopylov, Igor & Miller, Joshua Benjamin, 2018. "Subjective Beliefs And Confidence When Facts Are Forgotten," OSF Preprints wktcp, Center for Open Science.
- Igor Kopylov & Joshua Miller, 2018. "Subjective beliefs and confidence when facts are forgotten," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 281-299, December.
- Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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