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Incentives for voluntary disclosure

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  • Ronen, Joshua
  • Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein)

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  • Ronen, Joshua & Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein), 2001. "Incentives for voluntary disclosure," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 309-357, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finmar:v:4:y:2001:i:4:p:309-357
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Skinner, Dj, 1994. "Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad-News," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 38-60.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    3. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. "Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
    5. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Krishnan, Murugappa, 1999. "To believe or not to believe1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 69-98, February.
    6. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1989. "Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 633-646, July.
    7. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    8. Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. "Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-1359, September.
    9. H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
    10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rajiv D. Banker & Masako Darrough & Shaopeng Li & Lucas Threinen, 2019. "The Value of Precontract Information About an Agent's Ability in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1201-1245, December.
    2. Dobler, Michael, 2008. "Incentives for risk reporting -- A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-206.

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