IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/energy/v89y2015icp490-499.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An autonomous demand response program for electricity and natural gas networks in smart energy hubs

Author

Listed:
  • Sheikhi, Aras
  • Bahrami, Shahab
  • Ranjbar, Ali Mohammad

Abstract

The development of technologies such as micro turbines and gas furnaces has been the major driving force towards integration of electricity and natural gas networks in the EH (energy hubs). Besides, the existing power grids are getting smarter by implementing the new generation of information technologies and communication systems. In smart grid, the electricity suppliers can modify the customers' electrical load consumption by employing appropriate scheduling schemes such as DR (demand response) programs. In this paper, we consider the S. E. Hubs (smart energy hubs) framework, in which the customers can use EMS (energy management system) to access to the electricity and natural gas prices data and wisely manage their daily energy consumption. We extend the existing DR programs to the IDR (integrated demand response) programs with the aim of modifying both electricity and natural gas consumption on the customer side. The interaction between S.E. hubs in the IDR program is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The goal of the IDR game is to maximize the natural gas and electricity utility companies' profit and to minimize the customers' consumption cost. It is shown that the proposed game model is an ordinal potential game with unique Nash equilibrium. Simulations are performed on an energy system with 6 S. E. Hubs, one electricity utility, and one natural gas utility companies. The results confirm that the IDR program can benefit both the customer side, by reducing the electricity and gas consumption cost, and the supplier side, by reducing the peak load demand in the electricity and natural gas load profiles.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheikhi, Aras & Bahrami, Shahab & Ranjbar, Ali Mohammad, 2015. "An autonomous demand response program for electricity and natural gas networks in smart energy hubs," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 490-499.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:490-499
    DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2015.05.109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544215007318
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.energy.2015.05.109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Golombek, Rolf & Brekke, Kjell Arne & Kittelsen, Sverre A.C., 2013. "Is electricity more important than natural gas? Partial liberalizations of the Western European energy markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 99-111.
    2. Bhatt, Jignesh & Shah, Vipul & Jani, Omkar, 2014. "An instrumentation engineer’s review on smart grid: Critical applications and parameters," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1217-1239.
    3. Ioakimidis, Christos S. & Oliveira, Luís J. & Genikomsakis, Konstantinos N. & Dallas, Panagiotis I., 2014. "Design, architecture and implementation of a residential energy box management tool in a SmartGrid," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 167-181.
    4. Broman Toft, Madeleine & Schuitema, Geertje & Thøgersen, John, 2014. "Responsible technology acceptance: Model development and application to consumer acceptance of Smart Grid technology," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 392-400.
    5. van Goor, Harm & Scholtens, Bert, 2014. "Modeling natural gas price volatility: The case of the UK gas market," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 126-134.
    6. Wang, Jianhui & Zhou, Zhi & Botterud, Audun, 2011. "An evolutionary game approach to analyzing bidding strategies in electricity markets with elastic demand," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 3459-3467.
    7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    8. Mahmood, Anzar & Javaid, Nadeem & Razzaq, Sohail, 2015. "A review of wireless communications for smart grid," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 248-260.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jalali, Mohammad Majid & Kazemi, Ahad, 2015. "Demand side management in a smart grid with multiple electricity suppliers," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 766-776.
    2. Reka, S. Sofana & Dragicevic, Tomislav, 2018. "Future effectual role of energy delivery: A comprehensive review of Internet of Things and smart grid," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 90-108.
    3. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Falk Armin & Kosfeld Michael, 2012. "It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-36, September.
    5. Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 318-346, February.
    6. Anthonisen, Niels, 1997. "On the Convergence of Beliefs within Populations in Games with Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 169-184, September.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:19:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    9. Echenique, Federico, 2004. "A characterization of strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 325-347, February.
    10. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Misund, Bård & Oglend, Atle, 2016. "Supply and demand determinants of natural gas price volatility in the U.K.: A vector autoregression approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 178-189.
    12. Pinto, T. & Morais, H. & Oliveira, P. & Vale, Z. & Praça, I. & Ramos, C., 2011. "A new approach for multi-agent coalition formation and management in the scope of electricity markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 5004-5015.
    13. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R.P. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Directed Communication Networks," Discussion Paper 2000-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. William H. Sandholm, 2005. "Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 885-915.
    15. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    16. Voorneveld, Mark, 1997. "Equilibria and approximate equilibria in infinite potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 163-169, October.
    17. Qianchun Dai & Kequn Cheng, 2022. "What Drives the Adoption of Agricultural Green Production Technologies? An Extension of TAM in Agriculture," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-18, November.
    18. Yuting Zhang & Xiaofen Yu & Ning Cai & Yong Li, 2020. "Analyzing the Employees’ New Media Use in the Energy Industry：The Role of Creative Self-Efficacy, Perceived Usefulness and Leaders’ Use," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-13, January.
    19. Venkatasubramanian, Venkat & Luo, Yu & Sethuraman, Jay, 2015. "How much inequality in income is fair? A microeconomic game theoretic perspective," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 435(C), pages 120-138.
    20. Bin Ye & Jingjing Jiang & Lixin Miao & Ji Li & Yang Peng, 2015. "Innovative Carbon Allowance Allocation Policy for the Shenzhen Emission Trading Scheme in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-23, December.
    21. Bigoni, Maria & Fort, Margherita, 2013. "Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 192-214.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:energy:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:490-499. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/energy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.