IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v73y2014icp211-224.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets

Author

Listed:
  • Olsina, Fernando
  • Pringles, Rolando
  • Larisson, Carlos
  • Garcés, Francisco

Abstract

Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units.

Suggested Citation

  • Olsina, Fernando & Pringles, Rolando & Larisson, Carlos & Garcés, Francisco, 2014. "Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 211-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:73:y:2014:i:c:p:211-224
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151400295X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.014?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2008. "Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 194-201, September.
    2. Neuhoff, Karsten & De Vries, Laurens, 2004. "Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 253-267, December.
    3. Karsten Neuhoff & Laurens De Vries, 2004. "Insufficient Incentives for Investment," Working Papers EP42, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    4. Hung-po Chao, 1983. "Peak Load Pricing and Capacity Planning with Demand and Supply Uncertainty," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 179-190, Spring.
    5. de Vries, Laurens & Heijnen, Petra, 2008. "The impact of electricity market design upon investment under uncertainty: The effectiveness of capacity mechanisms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 215-227, September.
    6. Kleindorfer, Paul R & Fernando, Chitru S, 1993. "Peak-Load Pricing and Reliability under Uncertainty," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-23, March.
    7. Paul L. Joskow, 1976. "Contributions to the Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 197-206, Spring.
    8. Crew, Michael A & Fernando, Chitru S & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1995. "The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 215-248, November.
    9. Olsina, Fernando & Garces, Francisco & Haubrich, H.-J., 2006. "Modeling long-term dynamics of electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 1411-1433, August.
    10. Ford, Andrew, 1999. "Cycles in competitive electricity markets: a simulation study of the western United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(11), pages 637-658, October.
    11. Olsina, Fernando & Roscher, Mark & Larisson, Carlos & Garces, Francisco, 2007. "Short-term optimal wind power generation capacity in liberalized electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 1257-1273, February.
    12. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.
    13. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 1976. "Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 207-231, Spring.
    14. Batlle, C. & Rodilla, P., 2010. "A critical assessment of the different approaches aimed to secure electricity generation supply," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7169-7179, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zapata, Sebastian & Castaneda, Monica & Aristizabal, Andres J. & Dyner, Isaac, 2022. "Renewables for supporting supply adequacy in Colombia," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 239(PC).
    2. Perica Ilak & Lin Herenčić & Ivan Rajšl & Sara Raos & Željko Tomšić, 2021. "Equilibrium Pricing with Duality-Based Method: Approach for Market-Oriented Capacity Remuneration Mechanism," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-19, January.
    3. Hary, Nicolas & Rious, Vincent & Saguan, Marcelo, 2016. "The electricity generation adequacy problem: Assessing dynamic effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 113-127.
    4. Paul Simshauser & Joel Gilmore, 2020. "Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle," Working Papers EPRG2014, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    5. Simshauser, Paul & Gilmore, Joel, 2022. "Climate change policy discontinuity & Australia's 2016-2021 renewable investment supercycle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    6. Rios-Festner, Daniel & Blanco, Gerardo & Olsina, Fernando, 2020. "Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    7. Rios, Daniel & Blanco, Gerardo & Olsina, Fernando, 2019. "Integrating Real Options Analysis with long-term electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 188-205.
    8. Véliz, Karina D. & Kaufmann, Robert K. & Cleveland, Cutler J. & Stoner, Anne M.K., 2017. "The effect of climate change on electricity expenditures in Massachusetts," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-11.
    9. Brito-Pereira, Paulo & Rodilla, Pablo & Mastropietro, Paolo & Batlle, Carlos, 2022. "Self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy? The relevance of de-rating factors in modern capacity mechanisms," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 314(C).
    10. Wierzbowski, Michal & Filipiak, Izabela, 2017. "Enhanced operational reserve as a tool for development of optimal energy mix," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 602-615.
    11. Larsen, Erik R. & Osorio, Sebastian & van Ackere, Ann, 2017. "A framework to evaluate security of supply in the electricity sector," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 646-655.
    12. Bhattacharya, Saptarshi & Pennock, Shona & Robertson, Bryson & Hanif, Sarmad & Alam, Md Jan E. & Bhatnagar, Dhruv & Preziuso, Danielle & O’Neil, Rebecca, 2021. "Timing value of marine renewable energy resources for potential grid applications," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 299(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.
    2. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    3. Rios, Daniel & Blanco, Gerardo & Olsina, Fernando, 2019. "Integrating Real Options Analysis with long-term electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 188-205.
    4. Mier, Mathias, 2021. "Efficient pricing of electricity revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    5. Hary, Nicolas & Rious, Vincent & Saguan, Marcelo, 2016. "The electricity generation adequacy problem: Assessing dynamic effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 113-127.
    6. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Simshauser, Paul, 2020. "Merchant renewables and the valuation of peaking plant in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    8. Simshauser, Paul, 2022. "Rooftop solar PV and the peak load problem in the NEM's Queensland region," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    9. Arango, Santiago & Castañeda, Jaime A. & Larsen, Erik R., 2013. "Mothballing in power markets: An experimental study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 125-134.
    10. Rios-Festner, Daniel & Blanco, Gerardo & Olsina, Fernando, 2020. "Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    11. Simshauser, P., 2021. "Rooftop Solar PV and the Peak Load Problem in the NEM’s Queensland Region," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2180, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Mathias Mier, 2018. "Policy Implications of a World with Renewables, Limited Dispatchability, and Fixed Load," Working Papers V-412-18, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2018.
    13. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    14. Arango, Santiago & Larsen, Erik, 2011. "Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2457-2466, May.
    15. Correia-da-Silva, João & Soares, Isabel & Fernández, Raquel, 2020. "Impact of dynamic pricing on investment in renewables," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    16. Klaus Eisenack & Mathias Mier, 2019. "Peak-load pricing with different types of dispatchability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 105-124, December.
    17. Roques, F. & Newbery, D.M. & Nuttall, W.J., 2004. "Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0459, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Shanshan Hu & Gilvan C. Souza & Mark E. Ferguson & Wenbin Wang, 2015. "Capacity Investment in Renewable Energy Technology with Supply Intermittency: Data Granularity Matters!," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 480-494, October.
    19. Heidarizadeh, Mohammad & Ahmadian, Mohammad, 2019. "Capacity certificate mechanism: A step forward toward a market based generation capacity incentive," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 45-56.
    20. Petitet, Marie & Finon, Dominique & Janssen, Tanguy, 2017. "Capacity adequacy in power markets facing energy transition: A comparison of scarcity pricing and capacity mechanism," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 30-46.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:73:y:2014:i:c:p:211-224. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.