IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v35y2007i6p3126-3133.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Joint bidding restriction policy for selective E&P firms in the US Gulf of Mexico OCS: How persuasive is its effectiveness?

Author

Listed:
  • Iledare, Omowumi O.
  • Pulsipher, Allan G.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G., 2007. "Joint bidding restriction policy for selective E&P firms in the US Gulf of Mexico OCS: How persuasive is its effectiveness?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 3126-3133, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:35:y:2007:i:6:p:3126-3133
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301-4215(06)00427-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Otis W. Gilley & Gordon V. Karels, 1981. "The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 637-648, Autumn.
    2. Porter, Robert H, 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January.
    3. Steven W. Millsaps & Mack Ott, 1981. "Information and Bidding Behavior by Major Oil Companies for Outer Continental Shelf Leases: Is the joint Bidding Ban Justified?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 71-90.
    4. Walter J. Mead & Asbjorn Moseidjord & Philip E. Sorensen, 1983. "The Rate of Return Earned by Lessees under Cash Bonus Bidding for OCS Oil and Gas Leases," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 37-52.
    5. C.E. Moody Jr. & W.J. Kruvant, 1988. "Joint Bidding, Entry, and the Price of OCS Leases," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 276-284, Summer.
    6. Walter J. Mead, 1994. "Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-18.
    7. Rockwood, Alan, 1983. "The Impact of Joint Ventures on the Market for OCS Oil and Gas Leases," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 453-468, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Osmundsen, Petter & Roll, Kristin Helen & Tveteras, Ragnar, 2012. "Drilling speed—the relevance of experience," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 786-794.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G. & Olatubi, Williams O. & Mesyanzhinov, Dmitry V., 2004. "An empirical analysis of the determinants of high bonus bids for petroleum leases in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 239-259, March.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
    3. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2000. "Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-16, March.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
    5. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003. "Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Yusuke Matsuki, 2016. "A Distribution-Free Test of Monotonicity with an Application to Auctions," Working Papers e110, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    7. Matoso, Rafael & Rezende, Marcelo, 2014. "Asymmetric information in oil and gas lease auctions with a national company," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 72-82.
    8. George Deltas & Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2005. "Naive Bidding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 328-338, March.
    9. Karen Maguire, 2013. "Drill Baby Drill? Political and Market Influences on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing in the Western United States," Economics Working Paper Series 1401, Oklahoma State University, Department of Economics and Legal Studies in Business, revised Apr 2013.
    10. Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
    11. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.
    12. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    13. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2009. "Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 393-429, September.
    14. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2008. "Bidding rings and the winner's curse," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1018-1041, December.
    15. Sundström, David, 2016. "On Specification and Inference in the Econometrics of Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 931, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    16. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:n:4:a:2 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    18. Andy Cosh & Douglas Cumming & Alan Hughes, 2009. "Outside Enterpreneurial Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1494-1533, October.
    19. Bruce L. Alford & Otis W. Gilley & Charles M. Wood & Obinna Obilo, 2017. "“No sale” items in auctions: do they really matter?," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 155-168, March.
    20. Margolis, Michael & Shogren, Jason F., 2004. "Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 141-147, July.
    21. Vissing, Ashley, 2015. "Private Contracts as Regulation: A Study of Private Lease Negotiations Using the Texas Natural Gas Industry," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 44(2), pages 1-18, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:35:y:2007:i:6:p:3126-3133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.