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Corruption risk mitigation in energy sector: Issues and challenges

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  • Rimšaitė, Laura

Abstract

Background of the research is that corruption issues arising in the energy sector strongly depends on the location of the resources as well as the monopolistic nature of the undertakings or political decisions. The participation at the public procurement tenders result the information exchange between the competitors therefore lead to the market closure and increased prices for the end-users. Enforcement of anti-corruption laws have risen, including the imposition of huge fines for the enterprises, and prison sentences for offending corporate executives. The purpose of this article is to analyse and evaluate the factors resulting corruption actions in the energy sector and to reveal the intercourse between the competition law regulation and corruption regulation. The data collection, systemic review and other methods were used. Key findings reveal that corruption occurs due to the specifics of the sector as the resource location, politics, and public procurement. Significance of this research is high due to increased impact of the energy resources to daily life and the monopolistic undertakings resulting high prices to the consumers. Recommendations to minimise the corruption probability highlights the importance of the increased level of transparency and prevention mechanisms especially in the vulnerable areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Rimšaitė, Laura, 2019. "Corruption risk mitigation in energy sector: Issues and challenges," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 260-266.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:125:y:2019:i:c:p:260-266
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.10.066
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