IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v100y2017icp191-205.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili
  • Kaya, Murat
  • Şahin, Güvenç

Abstract

Deregulated electricity markets are expected to provide affordable electricity for consumers through promoting competition. Yet, the results do not always fulfill the expectations. The regulator's market-clearing mechanism is a strategic choice that may affect the level of competition in the market. We conceive of the market-clearing mechanism as composed of two components: pricing rules and rationing policies. We investigate the strategic behavior of power generation companies under different market-clearing mechanisms using an agent-based simulation model which integrates a game-theoretical understanding of the auction mechanism in the electricity market and generation companies' learning mechanism. Results of our simulation experiments are presented using various case studies representing different market settings. The market in simulations is observed to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game or to a similar state under most parameter combinations. Compared to pay-as-bid pricing, bid prices are closer to marginal costs on average under uniform pricing while GenCos' total profit is also higher. The random rationing policy of the ISO turns out to be more successful in achieving lower bid prices and lower GenCo profits. In minimizing GenCos' total profit, a combination of pay-as-bid pricing rule and random rationing policy is observed to be the most promising.

Suggested Citation

  • Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili & Kaya, Murat & Şahin, Güvenç, 2017. "An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 191-205.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:191-205
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.063
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421516305419
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.063?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    2. Pär Holmberg, 2017. "Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 372-395, October.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 3, pages 47-76, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Kahn, Alfred E. & Cramton, Peter C. & Porter, Robert H. & Tabors, Richard D., 2001. "Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 70-79, July.
    5. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing, 2012. "Agent-based modeling for trading wind power with uncertainty in the day-ahead wholesale electricity markets of single-sided auctions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 13-22.
    6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    7. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    8. Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James, 2000. "Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation or Reregulation?," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt22d2q3fn, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    9. Azadeh, A. & Skandari, M.R. & Maleki-Shoja, B., 2010. "An integrated ant colony optimization approach to compare strategies of clearing market in electricity markets: Agent-based simulation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 6307-6319, October.
    10. Veit, Daniel J. & Weidlich, Anke & Krafft, Jacob A., 2009. "An agent-based analysis of the German electricity market with transmission capacity constraints," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 4132-4144, October.
    11. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. D'avid Csercsik, 2020. "Strategic bidding via the interplay of minimum income condition orders in day-ahead power exchanges," Papers 2012.07789, arXiv.org.
    2. Debin Fang & Qiyu Ren & Qian Yu, 2018. "How Elastic Demand Affects Bidding Strategy in Electricity Market: An Auction Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, December.
    3. Wu, Zhaoyuan & Zhou, Ming & Zhang, Ting & Li, Gengyin & Zhang, Yan & Liu, Xiaojuan, 2020. "Imbalance settlement evaluation for China's balancing market design via an agent-based model with a multiple criteria decision analysis method," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    4. Pizarro-Irizar, Cristina, 2023. "Is it all about supply? Demand-side effects on the Spanish electricity market following Covid-19 lockdown policies," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    5. Csercsik, Dávid, 2021. "Strategic bidding via the interplay of minimum income condition orders in day-ahead power exchanges," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    6. Fang, Debin & Zhao, Chaoyang & Kleit, Andrew N., 2019. "The impact of the under enforcement of RPS in China: An evolutionary approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    7. Yang, Peiwen & Dong, Jun & Lin, Jin & Liu, Yao & Fang, Debin, 2021. "Analysis of offering behavior of generation-side integrated energy aggregator in electricity market:A Bayesian evolutionary approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    8. Ye He & Siming Guo & Yu Wang & Yujia Zhao & Weidong Zhu & Fangyuan Xu & Chun Sing Lai & Ahmed F. Zobaa, 2022. "An Agent-Based Bidding Simulation Framework to Recognize Monopoly Behavior in Power Markets," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(1), pages 1-19, December.
    9. Poplavskaya, Ksenia & Lago, Jesus & de Vries, Laurens, 2020. "Effect of market design on strategic bidding behavior: Model-based analysis of European electricity balancing markets," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 270(C).
    10. Esmaeili Aliabadi, Danial & Kaya, Murat & Sahin, Guvenc, 2017. "Competition, risk and learning in electricity markets: An agent-based simulation study," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 1000-1011.
    11. Christoph Graf & Viktor Zobernig & Johannes Schmidt & Claude Klöckl, 2024. "Computational Performance of Deep Reinforcement Learning to Find Nash Equilibria," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 63(2), pages 529-576, February.
    12. Xian Huang & Kun Liu, 2023. "Impact of Electricity Price Expectation in the Planning Period on the Evolution of Generation Expansion Planning in the Market Environment," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(8), pages 1-21, April.
    13. Esmaeili Aliabadi, Danial & Chan, Katrina, 2022. "The emerging threat of artificial intelligence on competition in liberalized electricity markets: A deep Q-network approach," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 325(C).
    14. Ruhang Xu & Zhilin Liu & Zhuangzhuang Yu, 2019. "Exploring the Profitability and Efficiency of Variable Renewable Energy in Spot Electricity Market: Uncovering the Locational Price Disadvantages," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(14), pages 1-30, July.
    15. Liao, Qi & Tu, Renfu & Zhang, Wan & Wang, Bohong & Liang, Yongtu & Zhang, Haoran, 2023. "Auction design for capacity allocation in the petroleum pipeline under fair opening," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    16. Lu, Xiaohui & Yang, Yang & Wang, Peifang & Fan, Yiming & Yu, Fangzhong & Zafetti, Nicholas, 2021. "A new converged Emperor Penguin Optimizer for biding strategy in a day-ahead deregulated market clearing price: A case study in China," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    17. Priyanka Shinde & Ioannis Boukas & David Radu & Miguel Manuel de Villena & Mikael Amelin, 2021. "Analyzing Trade in Continuous Intra-Day Electricity Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-31, June.
    18. Motamedi Sedeh, Omid & Ostadi, Bakhtiar, 2020. "Optimization of bidding strategy in the day-ahead market by consideration of seasonality trend of the market spot price," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    19. Maximilian Borning & Larissa Doré & Michael Wolff & Julian Walter & Tristan Becker & Grit Walther & Albert Moser, 2020. "Opportunities and Challenges of Flexible Electricity-Based Fuel Production for the European Power System," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-26, November.
    20. Li, Qirui & Yang, Zhifang & Yu, Juan & Li, Wenyuan, 2023. "Impacts of previous revenues on bidding strategies in electricity market: A quantitative analysis," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 345(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Basuchoudhary, Atin & Allen, Sam & Siemers, Troy, 2008. "Civilization and the evolution of short sighted agents," MPRA Paper 11765, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
    3. Kets, Willemien & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2015. "Challenging Conformity: A Case for Diversity," MPRA Paper 68166, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chernov, G. & Susin, I., 2019. "Models of learning in games: An overview," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 77-125.
    5. Roger A. McCain, 2003. "Specifying Agents: Probabilistic Equilibrium with Reciprocity," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 9, Society for Computational Economics.
    6. Sent, Esther-Mirjam, 2004. "The legacy of Herbert Simon in game theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 303-317, March.
    7. David Schüller & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "When Focal Points are Out of Focus: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Come Dine with Me," CESifo Working Paper Series 4138, CESifo.
    8. Ehud Lehrer & Eilon Solan, 2007. "Learning to play partially-specified equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001436, David K. Levine.
    9. Alberto Locarno, 2012. "Monetary policy in a model with misspecified, heterogeneous and ever-changing expectations," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 888, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    10. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
    12. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    13. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    14. Bodo Herzog & Stefanie Schnee, 2022. "Exploring a Dualism of Human Rationality: Experimental Study of a Cheating Contest Game," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(13), pages 1-13, June.
    15. Áureo de Paula, 2013. "Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 107-131, May.
    16. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
    17. Holler Manfred J., 2002. "Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(5), pages 556-583, October.
    18. Casajus, André & Kramm, Michael & Wiese, Harald, 2020. "Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    19. Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece.
    20. Congleton, Roger D. & Vanberg, Viktor J., 2001. "Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-167, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:191-205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.