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Civilization and the evolution of short sighted agents

Author

Listed:
  • Basuchoudhary, Atin
  • Allen, Sam
  • Siemers, Troy

Abstract

We model an assurance game played within a population with two types of individuals -- short-sighted and foresighted. Foresighted people have a lower discount rate than short sighted people. These phenotypes interact with each other. We define the persistent interaction of foresighted people with other foresighted people as a critical element of civilization while the interaction of short sighted people with other short sighted people as critical to the failure of civilization. We show that whether the short sighted phenotype will be an evolutionary stable strategy (and thus lead to the collapse of civilization) depends on the initial proportion of short sighted people relative to people with foresight as well as their relative discount rates. Further we explore some comparative static results that connect the probability of the game continuing and the relative size of the two discount rates to the likelihood that civilization will collapse.

Suggested Citation

  • Basuchoudhary, Atin & Allen, Sam & Siemers, Troy, 2008. "Civilization and the evolution of short sighted agents," MPRA Paper 11765, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11765
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11765/1/MPRA_paper_11765.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
    3. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. David, Paul A, 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-337, May.
    5. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Short (sighted) people got no reason to live
      by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2008-12-02 19:07:16

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    Cited by:

    1. Atin Basuchoudhary, 2014. "Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 317-320, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    society; breakdown; evolution; replicator; dynamic; process; civilization; conflict; institution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • N3 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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