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A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS - ED interface

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  • Panayides, Michalis
  • Knight, Vince
  • Harper, Paul

Abstract

This research describes the development and application of a 3-player game theoretic model between two queueing systems and a service that distributes individuals to them. The resultant model is used to explore dynamics between all players. The first aspect of this work is the development of a queueing system with two consecutive waiting spaces where the strategic managerial behaviour corresponds to how individuals use these waiting spaces. Two modelling techniques are deployed: discrete event simulation and Markov chains. The state probabilities of the Markov chain system are used to extract the performance measures of the queueing model (e.g. mean time in each waiting room, mean number of individuals in each room, etc.). A 3-player game theoretic model is subsequently proposed between the two queueing systems and the service that distributes individuals to them. In particular this can be viewed as a 2-player normal-form game where the utilities are determined by a third player with its own strategies and objectives. A backwards induction technique is used to get the utilities of the normal-form game between the two queueing systems. This particular system has many applications, including those in healthcare where it captures the emergent behaviour between the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and the Emergency Department (ED). The impact of time-target measures on patient well-being is explored in this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Panayides, Michalis & Knight, Vince & Harper, Paul, 2023. "A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS - ED interface," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1236-1258.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:305:y:2023:i:3:p:1236-1258
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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