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The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives

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  • Marchant, T.
  • Mishra, D.

Abstract

In the framework of implementable social choice functions, we present an axiomatic characterization of affine maximizers for an important missing case in the literature: that of two alternatives with restricted domain. We use two independent conditions: Positive Association of Differences and an independence condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Marchant, T. & Mishra, D., 2018. "The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(3), pages 1038-1043.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:266:y:2018:i:3:p:1038-1043
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.054
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2015. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 433-455, February.
    2. Fadaei, Salman & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(2), pages 767-777.
    3. Papakonstantinou, Athanasios & Bogetoft, Peter, 2017. "Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(3), pages 1171-1180.
    4. Sham M. Kakade & Ilan Lobel & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 837-854, August.
    5. Thirumulanathan, D. & Vinay, H. & Bhashyam, Srikrishna & Sundaresan, Rajesh, 2017. "Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 262(3), pages 1196-1207.
    6. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
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