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Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources

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  • Rudolf Avenhaus
  • Morton J. Canty

Abstract

For routine inspections in the frame of arms control, we address the determination of a rational basis for the distribution of available verification resources among controlled States. The analysis is performed primarily in the context of the nonproliferation treaty. In the spirit of this treaty, which in its original conception stressed objectivity, we adopt a formal, quantified point of view applying the theory of n‐person noncooperative games. Emphasis is placed on the conditions necessary for fulfillment of the fundamental verification objective of deterring illegal behavior, and reasonable and intuitively understandable conclusions are derived. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 295–303, 2011

Suggested Citation

  • Rudolf Avenhaus & Morton J. Canty, 2011. "Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(3), pages 295-303, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:58:y:2011:i:3:p:295-303
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.20360
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Avenhaus,Rudolf & Canty,Morton John, 1996. "Compliance Quantified," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553667, October.
    2. Harvey Diamond, 1982. "Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 139-153, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
    2. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.
    3. Clemens Listner & Irmgard Niemeyer & Morton Canty & Gotthard Stein, 2016. "A strategic model for state compliance verification," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 260-271, April.

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