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The evolutionary dynamics of audit

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  • Anastasopoulos, Nikolaos P.
  • Anastasopoulos, Markos P.

Abstract

A critical issue in auditing is provisioning of reasonable assurance that the financial reports are free from material misstatements. The auditing detection problem can be viewed as a two-player game between the auditor and the auditee where the auditor aims at eliminating misstatements, reducing at the same time his audit efforts, while the auditee aims at benefiting from fraudulent financial reporting and defalcation.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastasopoulos, Nikolaos P. & Anastasopoulos, Markos P., 2012. "The evolutionary dynamics of audit," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 469-476.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:216:y:2012:i:2:p:469-476
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.003
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    2. Nikolaos Anastasopoulos & Dimitrios Asteriou, 2021. "Optimal dynamic auditing based on game theory," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 1887-1912, September.
    3. André Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2013. "An Evolutionary Game for the Issues of Social Investment, Environmental Compliance and Consumer Boycott," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/17, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
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    7. Shandong Mou & Kexin Zhong & Yamin Ma, 2023. "Regulating the Big Data-Based Discriminatory Pricing in Platform Retailing: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-21, June.
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    9. JiWen Chai & LiHao Wang, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis of big data discriminatory pricing diffusion based on the supervision of relevant interest parties," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 2094-2101, June.
    10. Galeotti, Marcello & Rabitti, Giovanni & Vannucci, Emanuele, 2020. "An evolutionary approach to fraud management," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 284(3), pages 1167-1177.
    11. da Silva Rocha, André Barreira & Salomão, Gabriel Meyer, 2019. "Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(2), pages 486-501.
    12. Liu, Dehai & Xiao, Xingzhi & Li, Hongyi & Wang, Weiguo, 2015. "Historical evolution and benefit–cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision: An evolutionary game analysis framework," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(3), pages 974-984.
    13. Xueping Wu & Liping Zhang & Jianhua Huang & Wei Li & Yanhua Chen & Wenhai Qiu, 2021. "Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-19, October.
    14. Dassiou, X. & Glycopantis, D., 2019. "The importance of reputation in the auditing of companies: A game theory analysis," Working Papers 19/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
    15. Laitinen, Erkki K. & Laitinen, Teija, 2015. "A probability tree model of audit quality," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(2), pages 665-677.
    16. Liu, Weihua & Long, Shangsong & Xie, Dong & Liang, Yanjie & Wang, Jinkun, 2021. "How to govern the big data discriminatory pricing behavior in the platform service supply chain?An examination with a three-party evolutionary game model," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
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