Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.001
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- Schottmuller, C., 2011. "Cost Incentives for Doctors : A Double-Edged Sword," Other publications TiSEM 2aa2a734-eadb-4f0e-89b3-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Schottmuller, C., 2011. "Cost Incentives for Doctors : A Double-Edged Sword," Discussion Paper 2011-105, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
- Boone, Jan, 2018. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Access to care and the role of cost effectiveness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 53-74.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap talk; Patient–doctor communication; Health insurance; Health market design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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