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Incentives in allocation of policy loans

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  • Zhang, Xinzhu

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  • Zhang, Xinzhu, 2000. "Incentives in allocation of policy loans," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 785-796, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:785-796
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
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