Effect of marine reserve establishment on non-cooperative fisheries management
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2017.07.004
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- Dahmouni, Ilyass & Sumaila, Rashid U., 2023. "A dynamic game model for no-take marine reserves," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 481(C).
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Keywords
Fishery management; Marine protected areas; Non-cooperative resource management;All these keywords.
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