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Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare

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  • Perc, Matjaz

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  • Perc, Matjaz, 2007. "Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 104-109, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:104-109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crawford, Vincent P., 2002. "John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 377-382, May.
    2. Holyst, Janusz A & Hagel, Tilo & Haag, Gunter & Weidlich, Wolfgang, 1996. "How to Control a Chaotic Economy?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 31-42, February.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Moller, Marc, 2005. "Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 13-19, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fan, Feng-Hua & Deng, Yanbin & Huang, Yong-Chang, 2017. "Investigation on financial crises with the negative-information-propagation-induced model," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 470(C), pages 94-104.
    2. Perc, Matjaz, 2007. "Flights towards defection in economic transactions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 58-63, October.
    3. Zhang, Gui-Qing & Hu, Tao-Ping & Yu, Zi, 2016. "An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with noise in prisoner’s dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 276(C), pages 31-36.

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