Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Julia Mortera & A. Philip Dawid, 2017. "A Note on Prediction Markets," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0215, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
- Khrennikov, Andrei, 2015. "Quantum version of Aumann’s approach to common knowledge: Sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 89-104.
- Shyam Sunder, 2001.
"Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
- Shyam Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
- Shyam NMI Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm213, Yale School of Management.
- Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019.
"Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 73-82.
- Satoshi Fukuda, 2018. "Epistemic Foundations for Set-algebraic Representations of Knowledge," Working Papers 633, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Robin Hanson, 1998. "Consensus By Identifying Extremists," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 293-301, June.
- Nicolas Vieille & E. Solan & D. Rosenberg, 2006.
"Informational Externalities and Convergence of Behavior,"
Post-Print
halshs-00120992, HAL.
- Vieille, Nicolas & Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon, 2006. "Informational externalities and convergence of behavior," HEC Research Papers Series 856, HEC Paris.
- Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "Commonp-Belief: The General Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, January.
- Galanis, S. & Ioannou, C. & Kotronis, S., 2019.
"Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Working Papers
20/05, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2023_04, Durham University Business School.
- Kiri Sakahara & Takashi Sato, 2019. "An Alternative Set Model of Cognitive Jump," Papers 1904.00613, arXiv.org.
- Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009.
"Informational externalities and emergence of consensus,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Post-Print hal-00464565, HAL.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated".
"Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey,"
Department of Economics
97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Working Papers 177, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Ziv Hellman & Yehuda John Levy, 2020.
"Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy,"
Working Papers
2020-03, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Ziv Hellman & Yehuda John Levy, 2020. "Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy," Working Papers 2020_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Hanson, Robin, 2002. "Disagreement is unpredictable," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 365-369, November.
- Bergin, James, 1989.
"We eventually agree,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 57-66, February.
- James Bergin, 1986. "We Eventually Agree," Discussion Papers 710, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation," MPRA Paper 8412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet," Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Fukuda, Satoshi, 2020. "Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 169-189.
- Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu, 1992. "On Aumann's notion of common knowledge: an alternative approach," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 46(2), April.
- Yiling Chen & Mike Ruberry & Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, 2012. "Designing Informative Securities," Papers 1210.4837, arXiv.org.
- Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1996. "Common knowledge: The case of linear regression," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 285-304.
- John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
- Crescenzi, Michele, 2022.
"Learning to agree over large state spaces,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Michele Crescenzi, 2021. "Learning to agree over large state spaces," Papers 2105.06313, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
- Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Áron Tóbiás, 2021. "Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 989-1019, December.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:8:y:1984:i:1:p:1-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.