Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
- J. Hirshleifer, 1985. "From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 221-223, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Martin Gregor, 2012.
"Modeling positive inter-jurisdictional public spending spillovers,"
Working Papers IES
2012/16, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2012.
- Martin Gregor, 2013. "Modeling positive inter-jurisdictional public spending spillovers," EcoMod2013 5193, EcoMod.
- Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin G. & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard, 2023.
"The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 73-87.
- Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard, 2021. "The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 419, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Alexandros Karakostas & Martin G. Kocher & Dominik Matzat & Holger A. Rau & Gerhard Riewe, 2021. "The Team Allocator Game: Allocation Power in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 9023, CESifo.
- Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2005. "IDS Models of Airline Security," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 201-217, April.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2008:i:3:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007.
"Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2006. "Weak Links, Good Shots And Other Public Good Games: Building On Bbv," Discussion Papers 06/09, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2006. "Weak Links, Good Shots and other PublicGood Games: Building on BBV," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0624, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Gregor, Martin, 2015. "Task divisions in teams with complementary tasks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 102-120.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
- Martin Gregor, 2008. "On the strategic non-complementarity of complements," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(3), pages 1-7.
- Martin Gregor, 2011. "Tradeoffs of foreign assistance for the weakest-link global public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(2), pages 233-251, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- TOSHIHIRO IHORI & MARTIN C. McGUIRE, 2007.
"Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 231-263, April.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin C. McGuire, 2006. "Collective Risk Control And Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-402, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin C. McGuire, 2006. "Collective Risk Control And Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion," CARF F-Series CARF-F-060, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Dulbecco, Philippe & Laporte, Bertrand, 2005.
"How can the security of international trade be financed in developing countries? A global public good Approach,"
World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1201-1214, August.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005. "How Can the Security of International Trade Be Financed in Developing Countries? A Global Public Good Approach," CAE Working Papers 33, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
- Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Todd Sandler, 2023. "COVID-19 Activities: Publicness and Strategic Concerns," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007.
"Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2006. "Weak Links, Good Shots and other PublicGood Games: Building on BBV," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0624, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2006. "Weak Links, Good Shots And Other Public Good Games: Building On Bbv," Discussion Papers 06/09, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020.
"Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2016. "Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology," Working Papers 1602, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
- Alejandro Caparros & Michael Finus, 2019. "Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology," Graz Economics Papers 2019-13, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2019. "Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology," Working Papers 1902, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
- Alejandro Caparros & Michael Finus, 2016. "Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology," Department of Economics Working Papers 52/16, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
- Ghislain Dutheil de la Rochère & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2011.
"The role of aggregation technologies in the provision of supranational public goods: A reconsideration of NATO’s strategies,"
The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 85-103, March.
- Ghislain Dutheil de La Rochère & Jean-Michel Josselin & Yvon Rocaboy, 2010. "The role of aggregation technologies in the provision of supranational public goods: A reconsideration of NATO's strategies," Post-Print halshs-00559406, HAL.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
- Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2003. "Health-promoting alliances," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 355-375, June.
- Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce M., 2003. "Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 355-368.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020.
"The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(4), pages 913-927, August.
- Alejandro Caparros & Michael Finus, 2020. "The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance," Graz Economics Papers 2020-10, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Ryoji Makino & Kenju Akai & Jun-ichi Takeshita & Takanori Kudo & Keiko Aoki, 2021. "Effect of disclosing the relation between effort and unit reliability on system reliability: An economic experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(4), pages 1-18, April.
- Todd Sandler, 2006. "Hirshleifer'S Social Composition Function In Defense Economics," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 645-655.
- Hubert Kempf & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2010.
"Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 763-787, August.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Hubert KEMPF, 2008. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working Papers 200817, CERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Post-Print halshs-00517085, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2011. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," CERDI Working papers halshs-00556944, HAL.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2011. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working Papers halshs-00556944, HAL.
- Kempf, H. & Rota Graziosi, G., 2009. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Working papers 240, Banque de France.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Hubert Kempf, 2010. "Leadership in Public Good Provision: a Timing Game Perspective," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00517085, HAL.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin McGuire, 2006. "Patterns of Non-exponential Growth of Macroeconomic Models: Two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet Models," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-450, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005.
"Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement. Une approche en termes de bien public mondial,"
Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(182), pages 427-447.
- Philippe Dulbecco & Bertrand Laporte, 2005. "Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement. Une approche en termes de bien public mondial," Revue Tiers-Monde, Armand Colin, vol. 0(2), pages 427-447.
- Philippe DULBECCO & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2003. "Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement - une approche en termes de bien public mondial -," Working Papers 200312, CERDI.
- Toshihiro Ihori & Martin McGuire, 2006. "Group Provision Against Adversity: Security By Insurance vs. Protection," CARF F-Series CARF-F-086, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Lei, Vivian & Tucker, Steven & Vesely, Filip, 2007. "Foreign aid and weakest-link international public goods: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 599-623, April.
- MIYAGIWA, Kaz & SATO, Yasuhiro, 2015.
"Illegal immigration and multiple destinations,"
Discussion paper series
HIAS-E-10, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- MIYAGIWA Kaz & SATO Yasuhiro, 2015. "Illegal Immigration and Multiple Destinations," Discussion papers 15116, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:74:y:2001:i:1:p:71-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.