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Economic rents in franchising: Do they exist?

Author

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  • López-Fernández, Begoña
  • López-Bayón, Susana

Abstract

This work demonstrates the very existence of economic rents in franchising using, for the first time, the franchisees’ actual financial statements. This finding makes franchising more appealing for applicants and supports the hypothesis that rents are efficient devices to motivate franchisees.

Suggested Citation

  • López-Fernández, Begoña & López-Bayón, Susana, 2011. "Economic rents in franchising: Do they exist?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 195-198.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:2:p:195-198
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael, Steven C. & Moore, Hollie J., 1995. "Returns to franchising," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 133-155, October.
    2. Kaufmann, Patrick J & Lafontaine, Francine, 1994. "Costs of Control: The," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 417-453, October.
    3. Windsperger, Josef, 2001. "The fee structure in franchising: a property rights view," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 219-226, November.
    4. Williams, Darrell L., 1999. "Why do entrepreneurs become franchisees? an empirical analysis of organizational choice," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 103-124, January.
    5. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2002. "The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting," NBER Working Papers 8868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucia-Palacios, Laura & Bordonaba-Juste, Victoria & Polo-Redondo, Yolanda & Grünhagen, Marko, 2014. "Technological opportunism effects on IT adoption, intra-firm diffusion and performance: Evidence from the U.S. and Spain," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(6), pages 1178-1188.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Franchising; Economic rents; Monitoring; Entrepreneurship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L80 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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