IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v67y2000i1p35-41.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

And a vision appeared unto them of a great profit: evidence of self-deception among the self-employed

Author

Listed:
  • Arabsheibani, Gholamreza
  • de Meza, David
  • Maloney, John
  • Pearson, Bernard

Abstract

Evidence is presented that the self employed expect better financial outcomes than do employees but experience worse realisations. This is consistent with theories that entrepreneurship is driven by unrealistic optimism.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Arabsheibani, Gholamreza & de Meza, David & Maloney, John & Pearson, Bernard, 2000. "And a vision appeared unto them of a great profit: evidence of self-deception among the self-employed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 35-41, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:35-41
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(99)00242-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Wren-Lewis, 1985. "The Quantification of Survey Data on Expectations," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 113(1), pages 39-49, August.
    2. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla, 1999. "Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 324-350, Summer.
    3. Jürg Niehans, 1997. "Adam Smith and the Welfare Cost of Optimism," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 185-200, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David de Meza, 2002. "Overlending?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 17-31, February.
    2. Marta Coelho & David de Meza & Diane Reyniers, 2004. "Irrational Exuberance, Entrepreneurial Finance and Public Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(4), pages 391-417, August.
    3. Jorge Padilla, 2020. "Big Tech “banks”, financial stability and regulation," Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de España, issue Spring.
    4. Michele Dell'Era & Luis Santos-Pinto, 2011. "Entrepreneurial Overconfidence, Self-Financing and Capital Market Efficiency," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 11.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, revised Nov 2012.
    5. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2010. "A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and its Implications for Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 16620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Opromolla, Luca David & Dell’Era, Michele & Santos-Pinto, Luis, 2018. "A General Equilibrium Theory of Occupational Choice under Optimistic Beliefs about Entrepreneurial Ability," CEPR Discussion Papers 13225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hyytinen, Ari, 2003. "Information production and lending market competition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 233-253.
    8. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    9. Jimenez, Gabriel & Salas, Vicente & Saurina, Jesus, 2006. "Determinants of collateral," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 255-281, August.
    10. de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique, 2011. "Overconfidence and moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 429-451.
    11. Hyytinen, Ari, 2003. "Loan market equilibrium with difference of opinion and imperfect competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 125-129, January.
    12. Giuseppe Coco & David De Meza, 2009. "In Defense of Usury Laws," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(8), pages 1691-1703, December.
    13. Parker, Simon C., 2013. "Do serial entrepreneurs run successively better-performing businesses?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 652-666.
    14. Giorgio Calcagnini & Fabio Farabullini & Germana Giombini, 2009. "Loans, Interest Rates and Guarantees: Is There a Link?," Working Papers 0904, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2009.
    15. Malcolm Baker & Richard S. Ruback & Jeffrey Wurgler, 2004. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10863, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Takalo, Tuomas & Toivanen, Otto, 2003. "Equilibrium in financial markets with adverse selection," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 6/2003, Bank of Finland.
    17. Osei-Tutu, Francis & Weill, Laurent, 2022. "Bank efficiency and access to credit: International evidence," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(3).
    18. von Rheinbaben, Joachim & Ruckes, Martin, 2004. "The number and the closeness of bank relationships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(7), pages 1597-1615, July.
    19. Daniel Pérez & Vicente Salas-Fumás & Jesús Saurina, 2011. "Do dynamic provisions reduce income smoothing using loan Loss provisions?," Working Papers 1118, Banco de España.
    20. Hainz, Christa, 2007. "The Effect of Bank Competition on the Bank's Incentive to Collateralize," Discussion Papers in Economics 2007, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:35-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.