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A two-part tariff monopolist with resale

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  • Flores, Daniel

Abstract

I model resale in the context of a two-part tariff monopolist identifying two groups: low and high demand consumers. There is a group of potential intermediaries that resell the good to low demand consumers. I show that under certain circumstances resale can benefit the monopolist.

Suggested Citation

  • Flores, Daniel, 2024. "A two-part tariff monopolist with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003938
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111909
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    2. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Monopoly with Resale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 362-375, Summer.
    3. Simon Loertscher & Ellen V. Muir, 2022. "Monopoly Pricing, Optimal Randomization, and Resale," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(3), pages 566-635.
    4. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Monopoly with resale," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 362-375, June.
    5. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    6. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November.
    7. Gabriel Carroll & Ilya Segal, 2019. "Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(4), pages 1527-1555.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-part tariff; Monopoly; Resale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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