Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
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Cited by:
- Flores, Daniel, 2024. "A two-part tariff monopolist with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
- Hendricks, Ken & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "How to sell in a sequential auction market," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022.
"Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2019. "Detectability, Duality, and Surplus Extraction," Papers 1905.12788, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Luca Rigotti, 2020. "Detectability, Duality, and Surplus Extraction," Working Paper 6903, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Moshe Babaioff & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets," Papers 2107.05853, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2023. "Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 1207-1245, May.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021.
"Information Markets and Nonmarkets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020.
"Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2147, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2147R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2018. "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13332, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021. "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers 2110.13121, arXiv.org.
- Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2023. "Robust Auction Design with Support Information," Papers 2305.09065, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
- Roberto Sarkisian & Takuro Yamashita, 2024. "Optimal student allocation with peer effects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(3), pages 551-571, September.
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Keywords
Ausubel-Cramton-Vickrey (ACV) auction; Auctions with resale; Duality in auction design; Non-local incentive constraints; Robust revenue maximization; Worst case;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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