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The consequence of societal secrecy for the financial constraints faced by firms

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  • Oyekola, Olayinka
  • Odewunmi, Samuel

Abstract

Does the level of societal secrecy aggravate or alleviate access to finance? We explore this question for 51,249 firms in 39, predominantly developing, countries, from 2006 to 2015. We find a strong positive relationship between cultural orientation towards secrecy in a country and financial constraints faced by its firms. Our results are robust to several considerations and emphasize the adverse consequence of societal secrecy for perpetuating financing obstacles for firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Oyekola, Olayinka & Odewunmi, Samuel, 2023. "The consequence of societal secrecy for the financial constraints faced by firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002070
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111182
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Olayinka Oyekola & Meryem Duygun & Samuel Odewunmi & Temitope Fagbemi, 2023. "Political risk and external finance: Evidence from cross-country firm-level data," Discussion Papers 2312, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    2. Olayinka Oyekola & Martha A. Omolo & Olapeju C. Ogunmokun, 2023. "Are majority-female-owned firms more susceptible to bribery solicitations?," Discussion Papers 2311, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial constraints; Access to credit; Societal secrecy; National culture; Firm-level data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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