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Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game

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  • Lahkar, Ratul
  • Mukherjee, Saptarshi

Abstract

We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Agents are divided into a finite set of types. The planner asks agents to report types, which generates a reported type distribution. Based on reported types and distribution, the planner calculates the efficient strategy level and a Pigouvian transfer for each type of agent. We show that this direct mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility in strictly dominant strategies, strong budget balance and ex-post individual rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2020. "Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:197:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303761
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M., 1992. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies : Characterization and existence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-35.
    2. William H. Sandholm, 2002. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 667-689.
    3. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    4. Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2019. "Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 423-460.
    5. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2022. "A Large Population Approach to Implementing Efficiency with Minimum Inequality," Working Papers 76, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Ratul Lahkar & Vinay Ramani, 2022. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pollution Control in Competitive Markets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 872-896, September.
    3. Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    4. Ratul Lahkar & Vinay Ramani, 2021. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pollution Control in Competitive Markets," Working Papers 68, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    5. Luis C. Corchón, 2021. "Aggregative games," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 49-71, March.
    6. Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2021. "Implementation in Large Population Games with Multiple Equilibria," Working Papers 62, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    7. Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2023. "Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 685-721, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Externalities; Pigouvian pricing; VCG mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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