Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108751
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Cited by:
- Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2022. "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 145-160, August.
- Konstantinos Protopappas, 2023. "Manipulation of moves in sequential contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 511-535, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
All-pay auctions; Reimbursement; Risk aversion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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