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Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness

Author

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  • Berga, Dolors
  • Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe
  • Moreno, Bernardo

Abstract

We study voting problems with an odd number of agents and single-peaked preferences. With only three alternatives, there are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work. In all these scoring rules, the best and worst alternatives are assigned a score of 1and 0, respectively, and any middle alternative a score between 0 and 12. For five or more alternatives, the score of any middle alternative must be the same, and we call this family semiplurality scoring rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Berga, Dolors & Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe & Moreno, Bernardo, 2019. "Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 199-202.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:199-202
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2005. "The scoring rules in an endogenous election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 115-125, October.
    2. Dominique Lepelley, 1996. "Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 491-500.
    3. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    4. Skowron, Piotr & Faliszewski, Piotr & Slinko, Arkadii, 2019. "Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 244-273.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moreno, Bernardo & Salmaso, Pietro, 2024. "The Borda and Condorcet winners coincide for lexicographic preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Scoring rule; Condorcet winner; Single-peakedness; Semiplurality rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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