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State of the debate contingent arguments

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  • Felgenhauer, Mike
  • Xu, Fangya

Abstract

This paper studies the informative content of controversial scientific arguments depending on the state of the debate. Researchers are assumed to differ in their degree of opportunism. The arguments considered are manipulable, may stem from sequential private experimentation and can be revealed selectively. Arguments of opportunistic researchers tend to be informative if there is a lack of consensus in the debate and uninformative if it is more settled. Arguments of more sincere researchers may be uninformative if there is a lack of consensus in the debate and informative if it is more settled. The effect of institutional incentives on the informativeness of arguments should depend on the state of the debate.

Suggested Citation

  • Felgenhauer, Mike & Xu, Fangya, 2019. "State of the debate contingent arguments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 46-48.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:46-48
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 829-856, August.
    3. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58, pages 829-856, August.
    4. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Persuasion; Experimentation; Manipulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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