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Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information

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  • Delaney, Laura

Abstract

This paper considers a real options model with incomplete information in a duopoly setting. I show that even in the presence of a first-mover advantage, there are circumstances in which the preemption region is eroded entirely and the only equilibrium strategy is of simultaneous-type: both players should exercise together or not at all. This outcome arises if the price paid by a player from exercising the option simultaneously with his competitor (over exercising alone as a Stackelberg leader) is low. Such an outcome has not been previously recognised in the literature. The underlying information structure has been applied in a one-firm setting to a range of different contexts of late, all of which have competitive pressures in practice. As such, the existence of this equilibrium under certain conditions ought to be recognised.

Suggested Citation

  • Delaney, Laura, 2019. "Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 42-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:174:y:2019:i:c:p:42-47
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thijssen, Jacco J. J. & Huisman, Kuno J. M. & Kort, Peter M., 2004. "The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 157(3), pages 759-774, September.
    2. Laura Delaney & Polina Kovaleva, 2017. "The dampening effect of iceberg orders on small traders’ welfare," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 453-484, November.
    3. Thijssen, Jacco J.J. & Huisman, Kuno J.M. & Kort, Peter M., 2012. "Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 219-225.
    4. Jacco Thijssen & Kuno Huisman & Peter Kort, 2006. "The effects of information on strategic investment and welfare," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 399-424, June.
    5. Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017. "Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 36-50.
    6. Elsner, Benjamin & Narciso, Gaia & Thijssen, Jacco J. J., 2013. "Migrant Networks and the Spread of Misinformation," IZA Discussion Papers 7863, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
    8. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2010. "Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 337-340, September.
    9. Benjamin Elsner & Gaia Narciso & Jacco Thijssen, 2018. "Migrant Networks and the Spread of Information," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 80(3), pages 659-688, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Timing games; Real options; Preemption; Incomplete information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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