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On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

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  • Li, Fei
  • Norman, Peter

Abstract

In a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper constructs examples that demonstrate that adding senders can result in a loss of information if any of these assumptions is violated.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2018. "On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 66-70.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:66-70
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gentzkow, Matthew & Kamenica, Emir, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 411-429.
    2. repec:oup:restud:v:84:y::i:1:p:300-322. is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian, 2022. "Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders," Papers 2202.06479, arXiv.org.
    2. Quan Li & Kang Rong, 2024. "Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 525-545, June.
    3. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    4. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
    5. Renou, Ludovic & Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 16801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    7. Pak Hung Au & Keiichi Kawai, 2021. "Competitive disclosure of correlated information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 767-799, October.
    8. Keskiner, Hilal & Gür, Bekir S., 2023. "Questioning merit-based scholarships at nonprofit private universities: Lessons from Turkey," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. Cheng Li, 2020. "Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 527-557, April.
    10. Ichihashi, Shota, 2019. "Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 276-288.
    11. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    12. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
    13. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    14. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
    15. Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    16. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
    17. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
    18. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    19. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
    20. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
    21. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion; Belief-splitting; Multiple senders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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